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Due to their usage increase worldwide, iPads are on the path of becoming key sources of digital 
evidence in criminal investigations. This research investigated the logical backup acquisition and 
examination of the iPad2 device using the Apple iTunes backup utility while manually examining the 
backup data (manual examination) and automatically parsing the backup data (Lantern software - 
automated examination). The results indicate that a manual examination of the logical backup 
structure from iTunes reveals more digital evidence, especially if installed application data is required 
for an investigation. However, the researchers note that if a quick triage is needed of an iOS device, 
then automated tools provide a faster method for obtaining digital evidence from an iOS device. The 
results also illustrate that the file names in the backup folders have changed between iOS 3 and iOS 4. 
Lastly, the authors note the need for an extensible software framework for future automated logical 
iPad examination tools. 
Keywords: iPad, forensics, logical backup, iOS, manual examination.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The popularity of the iPad continues to rise. Consumers are attracted to its unique features, such as 
increased storage capacity, user-friendliness, and the incorporation of an interactive touch screen. It is 
considered to be more personal than a laptop and more advanced than a mobile phone (Miles, January 
27, 2010). The rapid distribution of tablets to businesses and individual utilization is primarily due to 
the Apple iPad device (Pilley, October 8, 2010).  When Apple first released the iPad, they targeted 
consumer sectors rather than business sectors. Their advertisements and marketing campaigns 
reflected this strategy. However, the iPad is currently being adopted by an extensive scope of 
consumers, ranging from children to executives. It is also employed in unconventional settings, like in 
the hands of restaurant waiters as they take your order, or in boutique windows showcasing 
promotional material (Geyer & Felske, 2011).  
Since 2010, more than 25 million iPads have been sold in the US (KrollOntrack, 2011). Furthermore, 
70% of the iPad2 buyers were new to the iPad world and 47% purchased a 3G model. This 
demonstrates that not only are more buyers attracted to the iPad, but that consumers are looking for 
always-connected iPad devices (Elmer-DeWitt, March 13, 2011). Due to the ubiquity of these devices, 
criminals are starting to target iPad users, thereby committing a wider range of crimes (Pilley, October 
8, 2010). Hence, digital forensic scientists need to focus on investigating these emerging devices. 
Fortunately, new digital forensic tools and methods are being developed by researchers and private 
corporations to help law enforcement officers forensically examine iPads, despite the challenging fact 
that the iPad technology is continuously changing (Pilley, October 8, 2010).  
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research focused on logical forensic methods for examining iPad devices. This research intended 
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on answering the following questions:  
 What is the difference between using automated logical analysis of the backup files 
versus using a manual approach? 
 What data is saved in the backup folder of an iPad2?  
 Where is the data saved and how can it be extracted? 
 What is the difference between the backup structure of the old iOS and the new iOS? 
3. BACKGROUND 
3.1. iPad  
On January 27, 2010, the late CEO of Apple, Steve Jobs, announced the launch of a new tablet device 
called iPad. On March 2, 2011, the second generation iPad2 was launched. Users could enjoy features 
such as browsing the Internet, watching videos, viewing photos, and listening to music (Apple, 
2011a).  
With two cameras, high definition (HD) video recording capabilities, a dual core A5 chip, extended 
battery life, WiFi Internet connectivity, third generation (3G) mini SIM card, an endless variety of 
applications, and a thin and light design, the iPad2 stormed the technology market and created a new 
era in the tablet world (Apple, 2011b). The iPad2 was released with the new version of Apple’s 
operating system, iOS 4.3 (Halliday, March 2, 2011).  
The following section explores the iOS file system in more detail.  
3.1.1. The iOS File System  
In 2008, Apple released iOS – an operating system for the iPhone, iPod, and iPad. This did not trouble 
forensic investigators since the iOS used on the iPad was the same as that of the iPhone. Therefore, at 
the time, no further studies were required, as they had been previously performed for the iPhone and 
iPod touch. In April 2010, Apple took a major step by releasing iOS 4 which introduced further 
notable features, such as multitasking, gaming features, video possibilities, and others (Morrissey, 
2010).  
Being familiar with all the features and having a good understanding of the Apple ecosystem was a 
fundamental requirement for establishing a solid understanding of iOS forensics (Morrissey, 2010). 
The iOS is a mini version of the OS X, which uses a modification of the Mac OS X kernel and its 
development is based on Xcode and Cocoa (Morrissey, 2010). iOS is composed of four main 
components; Cocoa Touch, Media, Core Services, and the OS X kernel. The first component, Cocoa 
Touch, provides the technological infrastructure to employ the applications’ visual interface (Hoog & 
Strzempka, 2011). The second component, Media, contains graphics, audio and video technologies 
consisting of OpenAL, video playback, image files formats, quartz, core animation, and OpenGL 
(Morrissey, 2010). According to Hoog & Strzempka (2011), the third component, Core Services, 
delivers the primary system services for applications such as networking, SQLite databases, core 
location, and threads. The OS X kernel which is the fourth component, delivers low level networking, 
peripheral access, and memory management/file system handling (Hoog & Strzempka, 2011). It 
consists of TCP/IP, sockets, power management, file system, and security (Morrissey, 2010).  
Morrissey (2010) stated that the Hierarchical File System (HFS) was developed by Apple in order to 
support the increased storage requirements of people. HFS formatted disks at the physical level are in 
512 byte blocks, which is identical to Windows based sectors. An HFS system has two kinds of 
blocks, logical blocks and allocation blocks (Morrissey, 2010). The logical blocks are numbered from 
the first to the last on a given volume. They are static and are 512 bytes in size, just as the physical 
blocks. On the other hand, allocation blocks are used by the HFS system to reduce fragmentation. 
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They are collections of logical blocks joined together as clusters (Morrissey, 2010). 
The HFS file system manages files by using balanced tree (B*tree), which is a catalog file system that 
uses a catalog file and extents overflows in its organization scheme (Morrissey, 2010). B*trees consist 
of nodes that are assembled together in a linear manner. This linear method increases the data access 
speed by continuously balancing the extents when data is deleted or added. The HFS file system gives 
a unique number (catalog ID number) for every file that is created, and increases by one each time a 




Figure 1 illustrates the structure of an HFS+ file system as illustrated by Morrissey (2010). The boot 
blocks retain the first 1024 bytes. The subsequent 1024 bytes are retained for the volume header as 
well as the last 1024 bytes of the HFS volume, which is reserved as a backup volume header. The 
volume header stores information about the structure of the HFS volume. Next is the allocation file 
which traces the allocation blocks that the file system is using.  The following is the extents overflow 
file which traces all the allocation blocks that belong to a file’s data forks. A list of all extents used by 
a file and the connected blocks in the proper order is stored in this file.  
The catalog file stores the volume files and folders' information that are in a hierarchical system of 
nodes. There is a header node, an index node, leaf nodes, and map nodes. The attributes file is reserved 
for future use of data forks, and the start up file is designed to boot a system which does not have a 
built-in ROM support. The space after start up file is used by the file system for saving and tracking all 
the data in a volume. The alternate volume header, as mentioned previously, is where the backup of 
the volume header is retained. Disk repair is the main purpose for the alternate volume header. Finally, 
the last chunk of HFS file system structure are the 512 bytes, which are reserved (Morrissey, 2010).   
The file system for Apple portable devices is HFSX, but has one main difference from the HFS+. The 
difference is that the HFSX is case sensitive, thereby allowing the file system to distinguish between 
Figure 1. Structure of HFS+ file system 
Adapted from IOS Forensic Analysis: for iPhone, iPad and iPod Touch, by Morrissey, S, 2010: Apress. Copyright 2010 © by Sean Morrissey 
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two files that have the exact identical name. For instance, both test.doc and Test.doc can be created on 
the HFSX file system (Morrissey, 2010).  
According to Cellebrite (2011), two partitions are included in the Apple devices. The first partition is 
the system partition, which is about 1 GB. The iOS and basic applications are stored in the first 
partition (G´omez-Miralles & Arnedo-Moreno, 2011). Although encryption may be enabled on the 
iDevice, the system partition is not encrypted (Cellebrite, July 3, 2011). However, the second partition 
is the one of interest, as it holds all the user data that can have evidentiary value. This partition 
includes all the photos, messages, GPS, videos, and other data that is generated by the user (Cellebrite, 
July 3, 2011). Extracting the protected files can be a challenge if encryption is enabled (Cellebrite, 
2011).  
3.1.2 Related Work 
A paper by Luis G´omez-Miralles and Joan Arnedo-Moreno explored the method of obtaining a 
forensic image of the iPad using a Camera Connection Kit. The advantage of their method was the 
ability to decrease time by attaching an external hard disk to the iPad using a USB connection. Their 
method consisted of two parts. The first part was setting up the device by jailbreaking it. The second 
part was to acquire a forensic image, by connecting Apple’s Camera Connection Kit, which was used 
to mount the USB hard drive.  Next, was to obtain a forensic image using the dd command  (G´omez-
Miralles & Arnedo-Moreno, 2011).  
Another research study by Mona Bader and Ibrahim Baggili, explored the forensic processing of the 
third generation of Apple iPhone 3GS 2.2.1 by using the Apple iTunes backup utility to retrieve a 
logical backup. Their research showed that the Backup folder with its backup files contains data that 
has evidentiary value, as the iPhone file system saves the data in binary lists and database files. 
Additionally, their results showed that XML format plist files are used to store device configuration, 
status, and application settings. Bader and Baggili (2010) stated that the backed up files from the 
iPhone contain information that could have evidentiary significance such as text messages, email 
messages, and GPS locations. The manual examination introduced in this paper is an extension of their 
work to the iPad2 device. 
4. DESIGN – METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
The methodology in this research takes into consideration the Computer Forensics Tool Testing 
guidelines established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (NIST, 2003). At 
a high level, the authors followed the following procedures: 
1. Certain scenarios were entered onto three iPad2 devices 
2. The devices were backed up (logically acquired) 
3. The backup folders were then parsed using automated forensic tools and manually 
4. The results were compared 
After the scenario was created, the iPad2 was geared up for logical acquisition. The specifications of 
the devices used in the acquisition process are listed in Table 1. Then, the forensic tools were chosen 
to perform the logical acquisition. After reviewing some of the available tools' specifications and their 
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Mac OS X 
Version 10.6.8 
Processor: 2.26 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo 
Memory: 2 GB 1067 MHz DDR3 
iPad 
iPad 3G + WiFi 
Storage: 64 GB 
iOS: 4.10.01 
 




Version 2.0 operatable on:  
Minimum of Intel based Mac OS X 10.6 with preferably 4GB 
memory 
Downloaded from: http://katanaforensics.com/ 













Downloaded from: http://sqlitebrowser.sourceforge.net  




Logical Acquisition Approach 
Logical backups contain a vast amount of data that includes all sorts of evidence (Bader & Baggili, 
2010). They are able to connect many dots, in any case, by providing further information about the 
computer that was previously used to synchronize the iDevice, and the owner of the device, including 
his/her interests and whereabouts (Bader & Baggili, 2010). 
The logical backup was captured through the iTunes utility using a Mac OS X version 10.6.8. The 
system utilizes Apple’s synchronization protocol in order to have all of the iDevice's data copied to the 
forensic workstation (Bader & Baggili, 2010).   
It is important to note that any automatically initiated backup on iTunes may contaminate the iDevice 
by transferring data from the forensic workstation to the iDevice as a part of the synchronization 
(Bader & Baggili, 2010). This was noted, and steered clear of, prior to connecting the iPad to the 
forensic workstation by disabling the synchronization option in iTunes. 
The logical backup folder was parsed using different methods: first, by using Katana Forensic Lantern. 
This software directly acquires the backup from the iDevice – provided that the automatic 
synchronization with iTunes is turned off; second, by using the iPhone Backup Extractor tool that 
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presents the backup data in a more visually appealing form than the original data; and third, through a 
manual examination of the backup folder. 
Other software and tools were required to manually investigate the backup data such as the SQLite 
Database browser, PlistEdit Pro, and TextEdit as mentioned in Table 2. In order to prepare the iPad2 
and backup data, a scenario was created on the iPad, by adding notes, email accounts, address book 
entries, photos (taken with the location option being On and Off), calendar entries and bookmarks. 
Then, the backup process was initiated using Mac OS X version 10.6.8 through iTunes version 10.4.1 
(10). More specifications are included in Tables 1 and 2. 
It must be noted that all the tests were conducted under forensically acceptable conditions, thereby 
avoiding any illegal access to the device through jailbreaking, especially since the main objective was 
to not contaminate the original data stored on the iPad2. According to Kruse & Heiser (2002), there 
are four key phases to follow in computer forensics processes, which are, access, acquire (logical), 
analyse, and report. These steps were followed in this research.  
4.1. Instruments 
4.1.1. Katana Forensic Lantern 
Lantern is one of the iOS forensic solutions currently available on the market, developed by Katana 
Forensics. It is well known for its low cost, yet fast and effective results. It enables acquiring the 
logical portion of three different iOS devices: iPhones, iPads and iPod Touch (Morrissey, 2010). After 
the device is connected to the forensic computer, Lantern backs up the files and allows the 
examination of data while it is still processing. Timeline analysis and geographic data features are also 
supported (KatanaForensics, 2011b). 
The software has an intuitive user interface. It is as simple as opening a new case, entering the case 
and evidence details, and then acquiring the device (KatanaForensics, 2011b). The maximum time for 
acquiring the iDevice ranges between 5 to 30 minutes, depending on the size of the device (Morrissey, 
2010).   
4.1.2. iTunes 
Media player, digital media organizer, and iPhone/iPod/iPad content manager, are the features that the 
iTunes application offers since its introduction in 2001. It also connects to the iTunes Store and 
enables online content purchases (Apple, 2011c). 
iTunes operates on both iOS and Windows, and is available for download, with no charges, through 
Apple’s portal. It is primarily used to maintain media, applications, books, and content purchases, and 
are all synchronized with the owner's Apple devices. It creates backups of all the settings and media of 
the connected devices such as iPods, iPhones and iPads. These backups restore the captured settings 
and details of the devices (Apple, 2011c). 
4.1.3. iPhone Backup Extractor 
iPhone Backup Extractor is a freely available tool that can parse data from the iPhone’s backup folder 
(ReincubateLtd, 2011). According to Morrissey (2010), it has the ability to convert the backup folder 
into CSV, VCard, or ICAL formats, so they can be easily viewed. It can also convert Keyhole Markup 
Language (KML) files for use with Google Earth if any location data is included. KML is an XML 
markup language used by map-related software for marking maps (Goldberg & Castro, 2008). 
Although iPhone Backup Extractor it is not considered to be a forensic tool, it provides means for 
examiners to analyse backup folders (Morrissey, 2010). 
4.2. Data Collection and Analysis 
4.2.1. Katana Forensic Lantern 
When the acquisition process was complete, the following extracted data was shown: 
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Device Information: It provided general information about the device being acquired such as device 
name, type, model, serial number, and software version. 
Contacts: This pane showed the phone book saved on the iDevice. It also showed all the related data 
to a contact in one single screen. 
Notes: Thoughts, ideas, points, lists, and many more things can be typed in this application and may 
be used as evidence in an investigation.  
Calendar: The calendar may include a great sum of information. It may contain appointments, events, 
notes, and important dates synchronized from many different devices and applications used by the 
user. Lantern’s software parses all the data and alerts if they are occurring (Morrissey, 2010). 
Internet: Considering the nature of the investigation being carried on, this section is of great 
importance. Lantern provides a clear list of all Internet bookmarks, displayed pages, and browsing 
history from the web surfing program on the iPad, which is Safari. 
Gmail: This pane shows all the registered email accounts on the iPad. In this case, the tested device 
had a Gmail account set up, and all related emails, their contents, sender and receiver related 
information were displayed. 
Dictionary: Each time text is typed on the iPad, it is logged and saved, and can be acquired during the 
investigation. Those entries can appear from texts typed into the device and are ordered in the dynamic 
dictionary file.  
Maps: iPad users may record maps and routes into their handheld devices. All those details are parsed 
and can be exported to Google Maps to show more graphical details and more specific locations. 
Those details, in turn, can be exported to Google Earth so they can be plotted on a map. 
WiFi: Shows a chronological order of all the WiFi connections attempted using the iPad, SSID, 
BSSID, and the security of that connection. This can be useful in capturing the access points the 
device was connected to. 
Photos: This pane may be one of the most important panes for the investigator due to the richness of 
the information that it offers. All images taken with the built-in camera include Exchangeable Image 
File Format (EXIF) and embedded geographical data (KatanaForensics, 2011b). Those images can be 
identified using Lantern and are also clearly viewed within the program itself. Lantern can extract the 
geographical data from EXIF so that the location can be easily plotted on Google Maps, illustrating 
where the photo was taken (Morrissey, 2010). 
Google Earth: Interesting data was found within the Exif associated photos taken using the built-in 
camera of the iPad. If the location service is on, it records the longitude and latitude of the exact 
location of where the photo was taken, along with other details about the camera type, aperture value, 
and many more related data. This data may be exported into a .kmz format, which then could be 
opened using Google Earth and show its exact location on the map.  
Report: Lantern provides an option of exporting all the acquired data into html format. This 
summarizes all the panes and their related data into one page – which is easier to navigate through. It 
also provides the source file from which the data was extracted. 
Third Party Applications: Although Lantern was of a great assistance in examining the evidence on 
iDevices, it did not provide significant details about third party applications installed on the iPad. Yet, 
it was possible to manually navigate through the exported report and find some related data to those 
applications.  
4.2.2. iPhone Backup Extractor 
iPhone Backup Extractor is not intended to serve as a forensics tool (Morrissey, 2010). It essentially 
parses the extracted backup folder into useful folders and file formats that, in turn, make it easier for 
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the examiner to go through (ReincubateLtd, 2011). Moreover, it parses the data in a more organized 
way and sorts it neatly e.g. .plist, .sqlite3, & .db files (Morrissey, 2010). iPhone Backup Extractor is 
not complicated and does not need any special knowledge to run and use (ReincubateLtd, 2011). 
The following descriptions are files of interest extracted using the iPhone Backup Extractor: 
Keychain-backup.plist: This file contains important tables such as the genp and inet. The tables 
contain accounts, their encrypted passwords, and related services (Bader & Baggili, 2010). 
Library: This folder contains most of the important data that can be found within the backup, such as 
the saved entries in the Address Book (and the related images to each entry), Calendar, Keyboard 
entries, Notes, Safari and more. The files are in .sqlite3 format and .db or .plist. 
Media: Media folder parses the photos and their data into their relative folders. 
Ocspcache.sqlite3: This database seems to include the digital certificates.  
SystemConfiguration: This folder shows a collection of PList files that contain data about networks 
the device is connected to, their preferences, and the power management details. 
TrustStore.sqlite3: This database contains the CA certificates that the iPad trusts. The CA certificates 
are used for security credentials and message encryption by using public keys (SearchSecurity.com, 
2011).  
Com.facebook.Facebook: This backup folder holds all the data related to the facebook account 
associated with the iPad under investigation. A database of all the facebook friends’ networks can also 
be found in .db format. 
Dynamic-text.dat file (Dictionary): Any text entered in the iPad is logged into a file called dynamic-
text.dat. This file can be of a great help to the investigator due to the insight it provides about the 
suspects usage of the device. It can potentially direct the whole investigation into the proper path by 
providing solid facts. 
com.skype.Skype: Skype provides video calls, screen sharing, and many more features. It can 
potentially reveal a lot about the suspect's personality and provide corroborating evidence. The 
database contains many tables such as Accounts, CallMembers and ChatMembers. 
com.apple.ibooks: This database mainly holds details about all electronic books and .pdf files added 
to the iBook application. It shows plenty of interesting related details such as the title of the item, the 
author, and the categories. This could provide further details about the personality of the suspects and 
their interests. 
Com.linkedin.Linkedin.plist: This PList file holds details of the Linkedin account used on the 
iDevice. It mainly shows general user profile details such as user name, job title, associated twitter 
accounts, pictures, and a link to the user profile and photo URL. 
4.2.3. Manual Examination of iTunes Backup Folder:  
A manual examination of the iTunes backup folder was conducted without using any automated tools 
to parse the files. The backup folder contained more than 2000 files. These files consisted of different 
kinds of files, such as PLists, SQL databases, images, HTML files, and more.  
As a part of the backup folder, three main PList files were generated; Info.plist, Status.plist, and 
Manifest.plist. In Manifest.plist, a metadata file identifies the .mddata and .mdinfo files. The 
Status.plist file holds the status of the backup, i.e. if it was completed successfully, and the date and 
time of the backup.  
Another file contained within the backup folder was the Info.plist. This plist file holds details about 
the backup and other information regarding the iDevice (GitHub, 2011). Other files found in the 
backup folder are Manifest.mbdb and Manifest.mbdx. These are binary index files that contain the 
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names and paths of the files in the backup (LeMere, 2010). It also contains the real names of the files 
representing the random strings in the backup folder (Ley, 2011).  The .mbdb  file holds the data of the 
original files, and the .mbdx  contains pointers to those files in the .mbdb file as well as the hex file 
names included within the backup folder (ROYVANRIJN, April 21, 2011). Furthermore, the .mbdb  
also contains a file header which holds the version number of mbdx and the number of records present 
in the mbdx file (LeMere, 2010). 
The following is the list of some of the files of interest found using the manual examination method: 
Dynamic Dictionary: Found in 0b68edc697a550c9b977b77cd012fa9a0557dfcb. 
iBooks: The SQLite database of iBooks is contained within the file 
1c955dc79317ef8679a99f24697666bf9e4a9de6.  
Skype: Many files related to the Skype application were found and examined – most of which were 
text files containing encrypted data, except the user names involved in the video calls were in clear 
text. In addition, a SQLite database was found with relevant data to the calls carried out, the duration, 
involved usernames, and language used. The SQLite DB had the following name: 
a6414be1fc3678b0ea60492a47d866db3a6d4818 file and its related Plist file had the following name: 
5c7504d4b4aa4395d7b3651bc0d523de121c3159. It was also found that the hash value of the 
application was not constant amongst multiple tested devices. 
Bookmarks:  Bookmarks database is contained within the file named 
d1f062e2da26192a6625d968274bfda8d07821e4 and contains many different tables within its database 
with data related to the bookmark URL and the title of each link. 
Notes: Contains details about the notes saved on the device. The SHA-1 value is 
ca3bc056d4da0bbf88b5fb3be254f3b7147e639c  
Twitter: Twitter data was in PList format and contained the usernames and content of tweets 







Connection WiFi: The file 3ea0280c7d1bd352397fc658b2328a7f3b1243b in all three tested iPads 
contained related data to the WiFi and network connections. 
Gmail Contacts List: An interesting finding of the manual examination was a SQLite database file 
containing email accounts, names, and mobile numbers of the registered Gmail account on the iPad. 
The findings contained information that was not initially entered for each contact in the list but was 
synchronized with a Blackberry device Address Book of the owner. 
The Gmail account is set up on the Blackberry and is synchronized with the device’s contact list. All 
contacts' mobile numbers were found in the backup folder since that Gmail account was also set up on 
the iPad under examination. This could lead an investigator to find a suspect's contact numbers, so 
long as they were mainly saved on his/her mobile device. 
Linkedin: The relative PList file to this application is named 
9c404eb0aa691005cdbd1e97ca74685c334f3635 and provides details such as the first name, last name, 
user name, profile URL, and the job title. 
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Calendar: The calendar contains two relative files in the backup folder, a SQLite database and PList. 
The former is saved under 2041457d5fe04d39d0ab481178355df6781e6858 and the latter under 
d351344f01cbe4900c9e981d1fb7ea5614e7c2e5. 
Keychain: This file was found in 51a4616e576dd33cd2abadfea874eb8ff246bf0e and contains genp, 
cert, inet, and keys tables. These tables provide more data about the accounts registered on the device 
along with their relative passwords and details. 
 
Table 3. Backup files and their relative applications 
Backup File Type Backup File 
Keychain PList 51a4616e576dd33cd2abadfea874eb8ff246bf0e 
WiFi Connections PList 3ea0280c7d1bd352397fc658b2328a7f3b1243b 
ade0340f576ee14793c607073bd7e8e409af07a8 












LinkedIn PList 9c404eb0aa691005cdbd1e97ca74685c334f3635 
Bookmarks SQLite d1f062e2da26192a6625d968274bfda8d07821e4 
Google+ PList 5f0a990d1c729a8b20627e18929960fc94f3ee6b 
Mail Accounts PList 5fd03a33c2a31106503589573045150c740721dd 
Airplane Mode PList 06af93e6265bf32205de534582c3e8b8b3b5ee9e 
Browser History SQLite 19cb8d89a179d13e45320f9f3965c7ea7454b10d 





Last Sleep PList 06642c767b9d974f12af8d72212b766709ba08fe 








Mailbox details PList a2d4e045244686a6366a266ba9f7ef88e747fe4b 
Photos SQLite bedec6d42efe57123676bfa31e98ab68b713195f 
Dropbox PList d00b419a7c5cbffd19f429d69aff468291d53b00 
Ocsp SQLite f936b60c64de096db559922b70a23faa8db75dbd 
 
4.3. Challenges 
Generally, investigators may face challenges no matter what device is being examined. However, 
since criminals continue to develop novel methods to cover their tracks, digital forensics has to 
constantly evolve with many technologies being introduced to defend against those harmful attacks 
(Husain, Baggili, & Sridhar, 2011).  
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A challenge that can be faced in a case is a locked iPad device. Since this is a user entered PIN, there 
are no default codes provided in the user manual providing an investigator with a limited number of 
attempts to try different passwords. As a security precaution offered by Apple on all iDevices, 
multiple unsuccessful attempts may lead to erasing all data on the device. 
Examiners should consider the following when a locked iDevice is being investigated (Apple, 
September 22, 2011): 
 Repeatedly entering the wrong password on the iDevice will lead it to being disabled for a 
certain period of time, starting with 1 minute. The more the unsuccessful attempts, the longer 
the disabled interval will be. 
 Too many unsuccessful attempts will lead to not being able to gain access to the iDevice until 
it is connected to the computer it was originally synchronized with.  
 The user may have configured the device to erase itself after a certain number of consecutive 
unsuccessful attempts. 
There are many ways to obtain the PIN of a locked device during an investigation (Punja & Mislan, 
2008): 
 Using common PIN numbers, such as the last 4 digits of the owner’s phone number, the year 
of birth, or any other related PIN that is found during the investigation. 
 Obtaining it directly from the owner. 
 Brute force attack (but may be inapplicable in case of having a limited number of attempts). 
Few software vendors claim now to provide features that take the investigation further by decrypting 
the forensic images captured and obtaining the passcode within 20-40 minutes depending on the 
passcode complexity through brute-force. Katana Forensics provides a complimentary application to 
their original Lantern program that images iOS devices. Since the complimentary software was 
released after the completion of this experiment, the newly added features were not tested.  
Another software, Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit, provides similar features to Lantern Lite. The 
former has iOS 4.x and iOS 5 Passcode Recovery. This forensic tool also performs a brute-force 
attack, even for complex passcodes. It also obtains the encryption keys from the iDevice. 
Another challenge is the differences in the iPhone backup structures depending on the installed iOS 
version. Since the early versions of the Apple firmware, there have been changes in the backup 
formats and structures. It started with .mdbackup files to .mddata and .mdinfo in the 3G iPhone and 
iOS 3.0. The former file type contained data related to the phone, where the latter held the respective 
metadata (Morrissey, 2010). 
Once iOS 4.0 was released, a new backup structure was introduced. The hashed filenames still held 
the data but without the .mddata and .mdinfo extensions (Morrissey, 2010). Instead, everything was 
stored in manifest.mbdb. This database contains the full path and filenames, and could be viewed 
using TextEdit (Hoog & Strzempka, 2011).  
5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS   
We share below the summary of our findings from performing this research. A comparative summary 
is also provided in Table 4.  
Katana Forensic Lantern:  
 Provides detailed, neat, and well organized results. 
 Exports the output into an html file that is very easy to scroll and navigate through. 
 Easy to export photos and WiFi connections data into a .kmz file that views their locations on 
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the map using Google Earth. 
 Limits previewing data related to third party applications in the main results window. But it is 
possible to navigate for third party details manually in the extracted reports from the tool 
itself.  
 Requires third party applications to view PList and SQLite files. 
  
iPhone Backup Extractor: 
 Organizes the backup folder into sub folders, separating third party applications from the iOS 
files, which contains most of the iDevice related data. 
 Some files found using this tool were not captured through backup folder manual examination 
such as TrustStore.sqlite3. 
 The output does not transmit the files to their related files in the backup folders and their 
related SHA-1 file names. 
 It is not considered as a forensics tool. 
 
Manual Examination: 
 Provides a lot of data which could be considered both good and bad. It is good 
because the logical backup data is not missed if fully examined. It could be 
considered bad because it is messy, randomly spread, and cumbersome to manually 
examine since the Backup folders contain thousands of files. 
 Provides more digital evidence than other built-in applications installed on the device 
like Twitter, Skype and Linkedin. Evidence includes user interactions with the 
application, such as chat details, private messages sent/received, usernames and the 
date/time stamps associated with these digital evidence. 
 Some of the databases found through manual examination contained information 
synchronized between the user’s handheld mobile phone and the email address set up 
on the iDevice. This can be of great relevance to certain investigations. 
 If certain installed application evidence is needed for an investigation, then this is the 
most appropriate method for an investigator to use. 
Differences between iOS 3 and iOS 4: 
Previously conducted research on the backup folder of the iOS resulted in relating the backup files to 
certain file names in SHA-1 hash values. It proved that those SHA-1 values were constant amongst 
certain applications in any backup folder, which made it easier to fetch the desired data directly from 
the backup folder without the need to go through each and every file. 
This research revealed some changes to the iOS backup structure and illustrated how some of those 





ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2012 
 
125 
Table 4. Comparison between the tools 














Logical Acquisition Yes Yes Yes 




Automated Yes No No 
Built-in Image Viewer Yes No No 
Built-in Text Viewer Yes No No 
Deleted Data 
Recovery 
No No No 
File Sorting Yes Yes No 
Third-party 
applications data (e.g. 
twitter, LinkedIn, 
Skype, etc…) 
Partial Partial Yes 
Report Export 
(HTML) 
Yes No No 
 
Table 5. iOS 4 backup files compared to iOS 3 backup files 
Backup File 
Type 










































6. CONCLUSION  
In sum, automated tools provide instant and visual evidentiary data from investigated iPads. Each 
automated tool has different capabilities; therefore different sets of results can be obtained from each 
tool. However, the manual examination provides more thorough and detailed evidentiary data from 
investigated iPads. This research points out that forensic software developers need to advance the 
capabilities of their automated tools. A robust technology that is capable of easing the manual 
examination process is needed. Overall, the authors propose that if a quick triage of an iOS device is 
needed, then an automated tool would suffice. However, if a more thorough examination is needed, 
especially if unique installed application data is needed, then the manual examination process should 
be utilized.  
7. FUTURE WORK 
On April 12, 2011, AccessData released the “Mobile Phone Examiner Plus (MPE  +),”  which is a 
standalone cell phone forensics application (AcessData, April 12, 2011). The main feature of this 
software solution is its ability to obtain the physical image of the iPad, iPhone and iPod Touch without 
jailbreaking the iOS device (AccessData, 2011).  Another software application that supports the 
physical acquisition of iOS devices is the Lantern Light Physical Imager, which was due to be released 
in mid October 2011  (KatanaForensics, 2011a). These tools should be tested in order to assure that 
they are operating as required (Baggili, Mislan, & Rogers, 2007). Further studies should attempt to 
examine the error rates in the forensic tools used when examining iOS devices. Lastly, this research 
points to the direction of creating an extensible software framework for examining digital evidence on 
iOS devices. This framework should allow the forensic software to continuously be updated with 
backup file signatures depending on the version of the iOS. It should also allow the software to update 
signatures of backup files for newly released iOS applications. 
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